hosen ciphertext security (CCA security)hosen ciphertext security (CCA security)C is now a widely accepted necessary security notion for public key encryption. CCA secure public verifiable public key encryption has many applications such as threshold public key encryption and proxy re-encryption etc. Furthermore, these years "random oracle model" has seen risen criticize by many cryptographers. Hence, researchers give great effort to pursue public key public key encryption with publicly verifiability in the standard model. However, all the existing CCA secure publicly verifiable public key encryption in the standard model relies on costly bilinear pairing. In this paper, based on Hanaoka and Kurosawa's efficient CCA secure public key encryption under Computational Diffle-Hellman assumption proposed in Asiacrypt'08 and the famous Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme, we try to construct a CCA secure public verifiable public key encryption without pairing in the standard model. As a result of its application, we achieve a CCA secure public verifiable threshold public key encryption without pairing in the standard model, a CCA secure unidirectional proxy re-encryption without pairing in the standard model.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Background
CCA secure Publicly verifiable public key encryption (PVPKE) is a very powerful tool to construct many other interesting cryptographic schemes or protocols. For example, chosen ciphertext secure (CCA) threshold public key encryption (TPKE) relies heavily on public verifiable public key encryption, since the distributed decryption server always needs to check the ciphertext's validity before decrypt, otherwise some valuable shared decryption will be returned to the adversary and this will help the adversary to break the chosen ciphertext security.
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For another example, chosen ciphertext secure proxy reencryption (PRE) also relies heavily on public verifiable public key encryption, since the proxy needs to check the validity of the ciphertext for the delegatee before re-encryption. And it is required that the proxy gets no useful information on these ciphertexts. Thus public verifiability of the ciphertext seems to be an essential requirement for achieving CCA security for proxy reencryption. Public verifiable public key encryption can also have some other applications. Now we revisit the literature on PVPKE from the following two ways: (1) chosen ciphertext security in the standard model and (2) primitives constructing with or without pairing.
1) Chosen Ciphertext Security in the Standard Model: Now chosen ciphertext security is a widely accepted security notion for public key encryption. The notion of CCA security was introduced by Naor and Yung [34] and further extended by Rackoff and Simon [38] , Dolev, Dwork and Naor [24] and Sahai [39] . These constructions relies heavily on non-interactive zero knowledge (NIZK) proof, which is a relatively inefficient paradigm. To the goal of devising efficient CCA secure public key encryption, cryptographers introduced a so called random oracle [7] which idealize the hash function as a perfect random function. Suppose a scheme can be proven secure under standard intractability assumptions, but in an idealized hash function model. Then the random oracle model view this as "strong evidence" that the scheme is secure. Many practical CCA secure public key encryption has been devised in this way.
However, random oracle model has recently seen risen criticism for its unrealistic assumption [14] . More and more cryptographers show interesting on constructing efficient CCA-secure PKE in the standard model (without resorting random oracles). Till now, there are four ways to construct efficient CCA-secure PKE in the standard model. The first practical scheme is proposed by Cramer and Shoup [19] , which further extended by themselves and other cryptographers [2] , [20] , [32] . The second way to construct CCA-secure PKE is the paradigm of IBE to PRE transformation, which allows to transform from a CPA-secure PKE to a CCA-secure PKE by relying on a selective-ID CPA-secure identity-based encryption (IBE) [9] , [11] , [17] , [31] . The third way owns to the concept of lossy trapdoor function introduced by Peikert [35] , and further extended by Rosen and Gilgor [36] . The fourth way is based on verifiable broadcast encryption, which is proposed by Hanaoka and Kurosawa [28] . Among the CCA-secure PKE schemes from these four ways, only the ones from the IBE transformation can be publicly verifiable. However, almost all existing practical IBE schemes rely on the time-consuming pairings.
2) With Pairings vs. Without Pairings: Bilinear pairings from some special structure elliptic curve are very useful tools to construct schemes these years. Since Boneh and Franklin constructed the first practical identity based encryption by using bilinear pairings, many wonderful results which can not been gained before now can be achieved by using the bilinear parings, such as fully collusion resistent broadcast encryption [12] ,efficient practical zero-knowledge proof [26] , searchable public key encryption [1] , [10] , attribute based encryption [27] , predicate encryption [30] etc. Now researchers often like to construct cryptographic primitives based on pairings [44] , [45] .
But we note that the implementation speed of bilinear pairing is still slower compared with computation of exponential modular. So recently many researchers show interest in instantiation of primitives without pairings which can only be realized by pairings before. [22] , [40] .
At first sight, one may wonder why we return back to "without pairing age" when we reached to "with pairing age", but we believe this research direction, on the one hand, can clarify to us which cryptographic task inherits the bilinear property of pairings and which not, on the other hand, it gives us a new view on old cryptographic problems such as CCA secure publicly verifiable public key encryption etc.
B. Our Contribution
The research topic of CCA secure publicly verifiable public key encryption without pairings in the standard model actually comes from our search for another goal -finding the CCA secure proxy re-encryption without pairing in the standard model. We find that almost it is impossible to construct such an excellent proxy reencryption, if CCA secure public verifiable public key encryption without pairing in the standard model have been not constructed. So we shift our attention to PVPKE without pairing. Surprisingly, based on Hanaoka and Kurosawa's paradigm of constructing CCA secure public key encryption based on verifiable broadcast encryption, we can construct CCA secure public verifiable public key encryption just by changing the order of group from prime to a composite one(which consisted of two large primes and can not be easily factored), we find our idea can also apply to the famous Cramer-Shoup encryption.
We achieve three first "excellent" public key encryption primitives. They are: a public verifiable public key encryption simultaneously satisfy: (1) CCA secure, (2) In the standard model, (3) Without pairings; a threshold public key encryption simultaneously satisfy: (1) CCA secure, (2) In the standard model, (3) Without pairings; an unidirectional (bidirectional) proxy re-encryption simultaneously satisfy: (1) CCA secure, (2) In the standard model, (3) Without pairings.
C. Related Works
1) Publicly Verifiable Public Key Encryption:
Publicly verifiable public key encryption in random oracle model seems easy to be achieved. Another related research area is (private) verifiable public key encryption, such as Camenisch and Shoup's work [16] . However, their work concerned with only the decryptor's verifiability of the ciphertext instead of publicly verifiability. Kiayas et al extended their work by introducing some new concepts for constructing group encryption [29] . Owns to bilinear property of pairings, CCA secure public key encryption with publicly verifiability can be easily achieved in this setting. CHK's paradigm [17] of transforming any CPA secure PKE into CCA secure PKE by using selective CPA secure IBE can result many CCA secure publicly verifiable public key encryption in the standard model. The same results can also get from Boyen, Mei and Waters' paradigm [9] . However, there are no work on public key encryption with publicly verifiable in the standard model without pairing. The situation is completely different in the "without pairing" setting, this is even an open problem left almost decade years.
2) Threshold Public Key Encryption: Threshold public key encryption has a long history. Desmedt et al. first introduced the concept of threshold cryptography in Crypto'89 [21] , then many distributed or threshold public key encryption schemes have been proposed [25] based on RSA or Elgamal. However, the first seminar work concerning about chosen ciphertext secure threshold public key encryption is proposed by Shoup et al. in Eurcrypt'98, they achieve the first CCA secure threshold public key encryption in the random oracle model based on Elgamal encryption [41] . Later, Cannetti and Goldwasser proposed the first CCA secure threshold public key encryption in the standard model based on Cramer-Shoup encryption [15] . They elegantly avoid the problem of ciphertext checking by using some randomness. However, their work needs the decryption server to store a randomness for every decryption, which is a shortcoming for practical application. In the "pairing age", it is easy to construct CCA secure threshold public key encryption. Baek et al proposed the threshold identity based decryption in the random oracle by using pairing [5] . Boneh et al proposed the CCA secure threshold public key encryption by relying on public verifiable ciphertext coming from CHK's paradigm [13] . Recently Delerablee proposed the concept of dynamic threshold public key encryption. Their work concerns on the dynamic threshold rather than on CCA security in the standard model without pairings [23] .
3) Proxy Re-encryption.: Mambo et al. first introduced the primitive of proxy encryption [46] in 1997. In their scheme, the delegatee can decrypt the ciphertext with the help of a proxy. But the ciphertext can not be decrypted by the delegatee or the proxy only. The first proxy reencryption (PRE) scheme based on ElGamal encryption [8] [22] in CANS'08, by integrating a CCA secure hashed Elgamal encryption and a modified Schnnor's signature. Since this scheme is constructed without pairing, it is a much more efficient one. But their scheme can not achieve collusion-resistance. The fist collusion-resistance IND-CCA proxy re-encryption without pairing [40] was constructed by Shao et al. in PKC'09, based on the public key encryption with double trapdoors proposed in Aisacrypt'03 [43] . But both schemes are only provable secure in the random oracle, thus how to construct an IND-CCA secure proxy reencryption without pairing in the standard model was left as an open problem.
D. Organization
We organize our paper as follows: In Section II, we give some preliminaries. In Section III, we give two CCA secure public verifiable public key encryption schemes without pairing in the standard model. One is based on Hanaoka and Kurosawa's paradigm of verifiable broadcast encryption, and the other is based on Cramer-Shoup encryption. In Section IV, we give our PVPKE's first application, a chosen ciphertext secure threshold public key encryption scheme without pairing in the standard model. In Section V, we give our PVPKE's second application, a chosen ciphertext secure proxy re-encryption scheme without pairing in the standard model. In the last section VI, we give our conclusions.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Number Theoretic Assumptions
For constructing our CCA secure PVPKE without pairing in the standard model, we need two assumptions:
• RSA Assumption. Select two large primes p and q.
Let n = pq and φn = (p−1)(q−1), choose random e which satisfy gcd(e, φ(n)) = 1.
The assumption says that, given random x ∈ Z * n , it is hard to compute y such that y e = x mod n. • Decisional Diffle-Hellman Assumption in Composite Field. Select two large primes p and q. Let n = pq and φ(n) = (p − 1)(q − 1), choose a random g ∈ Z * n which will satisfy g φ(n) = 1 mod n. The assumption says that, given random g, h ∈ Z * n along with g a mod n and h b mod n, it is hard to decide if a = b mod φ(n). The second assumption comes from Shoup's work on threshold digital signature [42] .
B. Publicly Verifiable Public Key Encryption
A Publicly Verifiable Public Key Encryption (PVPKE) system consists of the following algorithms (Gen, E, V, D):
• The randomized key generation algorithm Gen takes as input a security parameter 1 k and outputs a public key P K and a secret key SK. We write (P K, SK) ← Gen(1 k ). • The randomized encryption algorithm E takes as input a public key P K and a message m ∈ {0, 1} * , and outputs a ciphertext C, We write C ← E P K (m). • The verification algorithm V takes as input a ciphertext C and a public key P K and outputs valid or invalid to indicate the ciphertext is valid or not. We write valid∪ ⊥← V P K (C). • The decryption algorithm D takes as input a ciphertext C and a secret key SK. It returns a message m ∈ {0.1} * or the distinguished symbol ⊥. We write m∪ ⊥← D SK (C). We require that for all (P K, SK) output by Gen, all m ∈ {0, 1} * , and all C output by E P K (m) we have D SK = m.
1) Chosen Ciphertext Security: If the advantage of any PPT adversary A in the following game is negligible in the security parameter k, we say a publicly verifiable publickey encryption scheme PKE is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks: 1) Gen(1 k ) outputs (P K, SK). Adversary A is given P K.
2) The adversary may query to a decryption oracle D SK (·) polynomial-many times.
3) The adversary may query to a verification oracle V P K (·) polynomial-many times. 4) At some point, A outputs two messages m 0 , m 1 with | m 0 |=| m 1 |. A bit b is randomly chosen and computes a "challenge ciphertext" C * ← E P K (m b ) which is sent to the adversary. 5) A may continue to query its decryption oracle D SK (·) but it can not request the decryption of C * ". 6) A may continue to query its verification oracle V P K (·) polynomial-many times. 7) Finally, A outputs a guess b . We say that A succeeds if b = b, and denote the probability of this event by P r A,P KE [Succ]. The adversary's advantage is defined as |P r A,P KE [Succ] − 1/2|.
C. Threshold Public Key Encryption.
We define chosen ciphertext secure (CCA) threshold public key encryption for a static adversary. We mostly follow the notation from Boneh [13] . A Threshold Public Key Encryption consists of the following algorithms: 1) Setup(n,k,l): With the input of a security parameter l ∈ Z, the number of decryptions servers n, a threshold k where 1 ≤ k ≤ n. This algorithm outputs (P K, V K, SK), where P K is the public key, V K is the verification key, and SK = (SK 1 , SK 2 , · · · , SK n ) is a vector of n private key shares. The private key share (i, SK i ) is given to the decryption server i. With the private key share, decryption server i can derive a decryption share for a given ciphertext. Validity of responses from decryption servers can be checked by the verification key V K. 2) Encrypt(P K, M ): Encrypts a message M under a public key P K and outputs a ciphertext. 3) ShareDecrypt(P K, i, SK i , C): With the public key P K, the private key share SK i and a ciphertext C, it gives a decryption share µ = (i, µ), or a special symbol (i, ⊥). 4) ShareVerify(P K, V K, C, µ): Given P K, the verification key V K, a decryption share µ and a ciphertext C, it outputs valid or invalid. We say that µ is a valid decryption share when the output is valid. 5) Combine(P K, V K, C, {µ 1 , · · · , µ k }): Given a ciphertext C, P K, V K and k decryption shares {µ 1 , · · · , µ k }), it outputs a cleartext M or ⊥. Consistency Requirements. Let (P K, V K, SK) be the output of Setup(n, k, l). we require the following two consistency properties:
where SK i is the i-th private key share in SK, then ShareV erif y(P K, V K, C, µ) = valid.
2) If C is the output of Encrypt(P K, M ) and S = {µ 1 , · · · , µ 2 } is a set of decryption shares µ i = ShareDecrypt(P K, i, SK i , C) for k distinct private keys in SK, then we require that Combine(P K, V K, C, S) = M . 1) Chosen Ciphertext Security: Security against chosen ciphertext attacks, and consistency of decryptions are two properties to define the security of TPKE.
Chosen Ciphertext Security. The following game between a challenger and a static adversary A defined the security against chosen ciphertext attacks. Both are given a security parameter l ∈ Z + and n, k as input.
1) Init. The adversary outputs a set S ⊂ {1, · · · , n} which represent k − 1 corrupted decryption servers. 2) Setup. By running Setup(n,k,l), the challenger obtains a random instance (P K, V K, SK where SK = (SK 1 , SK 2 , · · · , SK n ). The adversary can obtain P K and V K, and all (j, SK j ) for j ∈ S. 3) Query Phase 1. Decryption queries of (C, i)
where C ∈ {0, 1} * and i ∈ {1, · · · , n} can be adaptively issued by the adversary. The challenger responds with ShareDecrypt(P K, i, SK, C). 
Decryption Consistency. The following game defines the consistency of decryption. The game starts with the Init, Setup,and Query phase 1 steps just like the above game. The adversary then outputs two sets of decryption shares S = {µ 1 , · · · , µ n } and S = {µ 1 , · · · µ n } each of size k, and a ciphertext C. Let VK be the verification key generated in the Setup step. The adversary wins if:
1) The shares in S and S are valid decryption shares for C under VK; 2) S and S each contain k distinct servers' decryption shares; 3) Combine (P K, V K, C, S) = Combine(P K, V K, C, S ). We let AdvCD A,n,k denote the adversary's advantage in winning this game.
We say that a TPKE system is secure if for any n and k where 0 ≤ k ≤ n, and any polynomial time algorithm A, the functions AdvCCA A,n,k (l) and AdvCD A,n,k are negligible.
D. Proxy Re-encryption E. Definition for Proxy Re-encryption
First we recall the definition of proxy re-encryption in [18] . A single-hop proxy re-encryption scheme(PRE) consists of the following algorithms (KeyGen, ReKey-Gen, Enc, ReEnc, Dec):
1) KeyGen(1 k ) → (pk, sk). When given the security parameter 1 k , This algorithm KeyGen returns a public key pk and a secret key sk. 2) ReKeyGen(sk 1 , pk 2 ) → rk 1↔2 . When given secret key sk 1 and public key pk 2 , this algorithm ReKeyGen returns a re-encryption key rk 1↔2 .
3) Enc(pk, m) → C. When given a public key pk and a message m ∈ {0, 1} * , this algorithm Enc returns a ciphertext C. 4) ReEnc(rk 1↔2 , C 1 ) → C 2 . When given a reencryption key rk 1↔2 and a ciphertext C 1 , this algorithm ReEnc returns a second ciphertext C 2 or the error symbol ⊥. 5) Decrypt(params, sk i , C pki ): On input a secret key sk i and a ciphertext C pki under public key pk i , this algorithm outputs a message m ∈ {0, 1} n or ⊥.
Note the ciphertexts can be divided into first level or second level ciphertexts. The security model for chosen ciphertext security can be found in [18] or [40] , interested readers can refer to those papers
III. CCA SECURE PUBLIC KEY VERIFIABLE PUBLIC KEY ENCRYPTION WITHOUT PAIRING IN THE STANDARD MODEL A. Review of Hanaoka's CCCA-Secure KEM from DDH
Let G be a multiplicative group with prime order p, and g ∈ G be a generator.
1) Setup(1 k ): Generate a random polynomial f (x) = a 0 + a 1 x + · · · + a k+2 x k+2 over Z Z p , and compute
The decryption key is f (x), and the public key is P K = (G, g, y 0 , y 1 , · · · , y k+2 , T CR, T CR, h) where T CR : G → Z Z * p is a target collision resistant hash function and h : G → {0, 1} ν is a hash function.
2) Encrypt(P K, M ): Pick a random r ∈ Z p , and compute ϕ = (C 0 , C 1 ) = (g r , g r·f (i) ), K = h(y r 0 ) where i = T CR 0 (g r , C 4 ) and i = T CR 1 (g r , C 4 ). The final output is ϕ. (Notice that one can easily compute g f (x) as g f (x) = 0≤i≤3 y x i i .) 3) Decrypt(dk, ϕ, P K): For a ciphertext ϕ = (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , C 4 ), check whether (C
B. Our Construction I: PVPKE based on Scheme HK 1) PKE.Setup(1 k ): Generate a number N such that N = pq, p = 2p + 1, q = 2p + 1, p, q, p , q are big primes. Generate a random polynomial f (x) = a 0 + a 1 x + a 2 x 2 + a 3 x 3 over Z ϕ(N ) , an element g from Z N such that g ϕ(N ) = 1 mod N , and a random number b from Z ϕ(N ) . Compute f (x) ≡ 3 i=0 a i x i mod ϕ(N ) ≡ b · f (x) mod ϕ(N ), i.e., a i ≡ ba i mod ϕ(N ), and y i = g ai mod N for 0 ≤ i ≤ 3.
The decryption key is f (x). The public key is P K = (N, g, y i , f (x), b, TCR). 2) PKE.Enc: The same as that in Section 4.1 of HK paper, but the values are modN .
3) PKE.Dec:
C. Review of Cramer-Shoup Public Key Encryption from DDH
The scheme assumes a group G of prime order q, where q is large, assume that cleartext messages are (or can be encoded as) elements of G. It uses a universal oneway family of hash functions that map long bit strings to elements of Z q . 1) KeyGeneration. The key generation algorithm runs as follows. Random elements g 1 , g 2 ∈ G are chosen, and random elements x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 , z ∈ Z q are also chosen. Next, the group elements c = g x1 1 g x2 2 , d = g y1 1 g y2 2 , h = g z 1 are computed. Next, a hash function H : G 3 → Z * q is chosen from the family of universal one-way hash functions. The public key is (g 1 , g 2 , c, d, h, H), and the private key is (x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 , z). = v. If this condition does not hold, the decryption algorithm outputs "reject"; otherwise, it outputs m = e/u z 1 .
D. Our Construction II:PVPKE based on scheme CS 1) PKE.KeyGen: Generate a number N such that N = pq, p = 2p +1, q = 2p +1, p, q, p , q are big primes. Choose two elements g 1 and g 2 from Z N such that g ϕ(N ) i = 1 mod N (i = 1, 2), and six random numbers b, x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 , x 5 from Z ϕ(N ) , where ϕ(N ) = 4p q . Choose a hash function
The public key is P K = (N, g 1 , g 2 , Z 1 , Z 2 , Z 3 , b, H, x i , i = 1, 2, 3, 4). = n!,
KeyGen: Generate a number N such that N = pq, p = 2p + 1, q = 2p + 1, p, q, p , q are big primes. Choose two elements g 1 and g 2 from Z N such that g ϕ(N ) i = 1 mod N (i = 1, 2), and six random numbers b, 
The decryption server S i computes
where C 3 is the set of the decryption shares, and its decryption server set is S.
A. PRE based on Scheme CS 1) PRE.Setup: Generate a number N such that N = pq, p = 2p + 1, q = 2p + 1, p, q, p , q are big primes. Choose a CCA-secure one-time symmetric key encryption SKE, two elements g 1 and g 2 from Z N such that g ϕ(N ) i = 1 mod N (i = 1, 2), and seven random numbers b, x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 , x 5 , x 6 from Z ϕ(N ) , where ϕ(N ) = 4p q . Choose three hash functions H i : {0, 1} * → Z N for i = 1, 3, and
The decryption key is SK = (p , q , x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 , x 5 , x 6 ). The public key is P K = (N, g 1 , g 2 , Z 1 , Z 2 , Z 3 , Z 4 , a, b, SKE, H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , x i , i = 1, 2, 3, 4).
2) PRE.ReKeyGen:
On input SK 1 = (p 1 , q 1 , x 15 , x 16 ) and P K = (N 2 , g 21 , g 22 , Z 21 , Z 22 , Z 23 , Z 24 , a 2 , b 2 , SKE, H 21 , H 22 , H 23 , x 2i , i = 1, 2, 3, 4).
• Choose a random number β such that it is in Z ϕ(N1) and Z N2 , andr from Z N2 . • Compute rk (1) = x 5 · a + x 6 + β mod ϕ(N 1 ). , and the delegator's public key is P K = (N 1 , g 11 , g 12 , Z 11 , Z 12 , Z 13 , Z 14 , a 1 , b 1 , SKE, H 11 , H 12 , H 13 , x 1i , i = 1, 2, 3, 4). Compute α = H(A||B||C) andᾱ = H(Ā||B||C), if A x 1 +x 2 ·ᾱ ·B x 3 +x 4 ·ᾱ =D b mod N A x 11 +x 12 ·α · B x 13 +x 14 ·α = D b1 mod N 1 compute β =D/Ā x5 mod N , and m = SKE.Dec(H 3 (A /A β mod N 1 ), C). Note that m may be ⊥.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Public verifiable public key encryption is a very powerful block to construct other cryptographic primitives or protocols. However, we find that in the literature, public verifiable public key encryption either constructed in the random oracle or based on bilinear pairings. Public verifiable public key encryption simultaneously satisfy without pairing and in the standard model has never been proposed. We solved this challenge in this paper by raising HK scheme or CS scheme's prime field to composite field (RSA field). Furthermore, we construct a threshold public key encryption without pairing in the standard model and a unidirectional (bidirectional) proxy re-encryption without pairing in the standard model. The future work will be further exploring our idea and prove these proposals's security.
